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From the Chair
Liesbet Hooghe
  
welcome to the first online edition of the EUSA Review! 
This version has been sent to every current EUSA 
member. We will continue to upload past issues on 
our website. Going online gives us greater flexibility in 
length and format, and it allows us to introduce interac-
tive features. It is also more economical and environ-
ment–friendly.
 This edition contains an interview of European 
Commission President José Manuel Barroso by John 
Peterson (University of Edinburgh) in July of this year. 
Those of you who attended the EUSA conference dinner 
in Montreal will remember President Barroso’s address 
to EUSA members. Barroso––an EU scholar turned 
practitioner––pleaded for a lively dialogue between 
theory and praxis. John Peterson took Barroso at his 
word, and asked him to read and comment on five 
scholarly pieces which EUSA members had selected. 
Barroso reflects on these pieces and more in an exclu-
sive interview.
 Two interest sections––law and political economy–
–report in this Newsletter. From the Law section, there 
is an article by Karen Alter on Euro-Law associations 
and European integration. In the Political Economy 
section Erik Jones reports on the vices and virtues 
of size of states. Andy Smith has coordinated several 
book reviews. And finally we introduce one of our most 
prominent sister organizations, the University Associa-
tion for Contemporary European Studies. UACES kicks 
off a new feature, an “EU Studies Corner.”
 In the previous EUSA Newsletter I made five 
proposals for revitalizing EUSA: one, decentralize the 
program committee; two, lift EUSA beyond area stud-
ies; three, accommodate more conference participants 
through poster sessions or ASA–style roundtable ses-
sions; four, stimulate group discussion and networking 
through APSA–style working groups; and, five, reach 
out through teacher–workshops. I would like to renew 
my invitation to respond. Please don’t be shy! Send 
your ideas/ proposals/ comments to eusa@pitt.edu. 
Your comments will appear in the next newsletter. 
Liesbet Hooghe
EUSA Review Forum
Q and A with President Barroso
following his plenary address to the EUSA biennial 
conference in Montreal in May, the President of the 
European Commission met with John Peterson of the 
University of Edinburgh on 17 July 2007 as part of the 
‘José Manuel Barroso = Political Scientist’ initiative 
launched within the EU-CONSENT Network of Excel-
lence.  Their conversation focused on 5 major pieces 
of academic research on European integration chosen 
in an open poll of EU scholars.  President Barroso’s 
‘reading list’ consisted of:
1.  Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks “Unravelling the 
Central State, but How?” American Political Science 
Review, 2003 
2.  Ian Manners “Normative Power Europe”  Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 2002
3.  Andrew Moravcsik The Choice for Europe (Chapter 
1) Cornell University Press, 1998
4.  Mark Pollack “Delegation, Agency, and Agenda 
Setting in the European Community” International 
Organization (1997)
5.  Fritz Scharpf “The European Social Model: Coping 
with the Challenges of Diversity”  Journal of Common 
Market Studies (2002)
 The full transcript of the interview (along with full 
data on the open poll results) is available at http://www.
eu-consent.net/DEFAULT.ASP).  An excerpt from the 
interview follows.
[In his answer to a previous question, President Bar-
roso spoke of ‘the issue raised by [Fritz] Scharpf – the 
question about asymmetry between economic and 
social Europe’.]
JP:
You mentioned Fritz Scharpf’s piece:  he’s written very 
perceptively on the European social model and was pre-
sented with a lifetime achievement award at the same 
[EUSA] conference at which you spoke in Montreal.  I 
asked him and all of these authors what I should ask 
you, and he wondered – and here we’re asking you to 
be a visionary – could you imagine a day when we might 
have common European minimum standards for social 
assistance and, say, minimum wages (perhaps defined 
relative to each country’s GDP or average wage level). 
2     Fall  2007   EUSA Review
The EUSA Review (ISSN 1535-7031) [formerly the ECSA Review] 
is published four times yearly by the European Union Studies 
Association, a membership association and non-profit organiza-
tion (founded in 1988 as the European Community Studies As-
sociation) devoted to the exchange of information and ideas on 
the European Union. We welcome the submission of scholarly 
manuscripts. Subscription to the EUSA Review is a benefit of 
Association membership. 
Editor:    Craig Parsons
Forum and Features Editor: Amy Verdun 
Book Reviews Editor:  Andrew Smith
Managing Editor:  Joseph A. Figliulo
2007-2009 EUSA Executive Committee
Liesbet Hooghe, Chair 
 (UNC Chapel Hill; Free University Amsterdam)
Neil Fligstein, Vice-Chair 
 (University of California, Berkeley)
Amy Verdun, Secretary 
 (University of Victoria)
Frank Schimmelfennig, Treasurer
 (ETH-Zurich)
Erik Jones 
 (Johns Hopkins University)
R. Daniel Kelemen 
 (Rutgers University)
Craig Parsons 
 (University of Oregon)
Alberta Sbragia, ex officio member
 (University of Pittsburgh)
Immediate Past Chair (2005-2007)
John T.S. Keeler 
 (University of Pittsburgh)
European Union Studies Association ®
415 Bellefield Hall
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260  USA
Web www.eustudies.org ®
E-mail eusa@pitt.edu
EUSA Review 
The simple question, I guess, is can social Europe ever 
be Europeanised in that way?
JMB:
It depends on the decisions of the member states.  We 
certainly would not object.  But, not in the foreseeable 
future, honestly, because today some of the member 
states in Europe – not only the new ones, but also some 
of the older ones – resist the temptation to harmonize 
in principle.  And this is very, very deep.  So what we 
can do, in fact, is what we are doing so far.  
In terms of principles, just look at the debate we’ve 
had on the Charter of Fundamental Rights.  The op-
position coming from Britain was because of the social 
aspects of it, we know that, more than any other con-
sideration.   Yes, we can agree on some principles, but 
to have regulations that impose a minimum set of stan-
dards that are very different from the standards that we 
have now?  Honestly, I don’t think that is likely because 
we don’t have the consensus for that at the European 
level.  And some people don’t think it would be desir-
able even if it were possible, and there are contradictory 
reasons for that.  Some of them are opposing because 
they don’t want to go further with integration, and it is 
not a question of them being more or less social.  It’s 
about giving more or less to the European Union and 
concerns about the principle of subsidiarity – that’s a 
factor. And in other cases, it’s because of competitive 
reasons and concerns about competitive advantages 
of their countries in terms of the fiscal systems and 
the labour legislation they have.  So what we can use 
are soft instruments:  from benchmarking to the Open 
Method of Coordination, which Fritz Scharpf writes 
about in his article.  
By the way, since he wrote this article, we’ve made 
a lot of progress, since it was written during the initial 
phase of the Lisbon strategy.  Now, in fact, we have 
enhanced this Open Method of Coordination regard-
ing Lisbon because now we have national reform 
programmes – OK maybe it’s not enough, according to 
some – but it is the first time ever in economic history 
that you have 27 countries willing to submit their national 
reform programmes at the same time to a common, 
independent institution.  We have the national reform 
programmes, we have the so-called Mr or Mrs Lisbon 
– so, a special appointment in all of the member govern-
ments in Europe, sometimes at a senior government 
level; so a sort of focal point – and we have the reporting 
to Brussels with some kind of collective monitoring.  So, 
we have reinforced the Open Method compared to the 
initial phases of Lisbon, including on social matters.  For 
example, we now have – it was our initiative – a debate 
on ‘flexicurity’ based on our communication and, in fact, 
we are pushing the member states to reflect on whether 
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we can do more and come up with new ideas for reform 
of their social systems.  Some kind of benchmarks have 
been established.  But, to answer very candidly your 
question, I don’t think in the foreseeable future that we 
will have this kind of hard legislation, if I may use that 
word, or regulation from Brussels.
JP:
Well, we’re welcoming you back to the academy to-
day.  But you’re also the President of the European 
Commission.  You mentioned the Lisbon process 
and monitoring and benchmarking, none of which is 
about the Commission proposing legislation using its 
traditional monopoly on the right of initiative.  You’ve 
seen our colleague Mark Pollack’s piece, which tries 
to identify both the sources of the Commission’s power 
and authority, as well as the limits on that power and 
authority.  Do you think the Commission has lost power 
and authority over time?
JMB:
No.  I think it has been, indeed, reinforced.  And for a 
very simple systemic reason.  Today we have 27 mem-
ber states plus the Commission – that’s the composition 
of the Council.  So what happens is that the more you 
enlarge, the more the institutions at the centre naturally 
have a more important role even in discussion.  I can 
make the comparison because I was Foreign Minister in 
the early 1990s and was participating in many European 
Council meetings then.  When we were 12 member 
states, sure, the Commission was making a very im-
portant contribution but then the member states – at the 
European Council level – could change positions more 
easily and be more decisive in the discussion itself.  To-
day, together with Council Presidency, the Commission 
really helps set the agenda.  And the conclusion is that 
it has a much greater say in the shaping of the outcome 
because with 27 Member States and the Commission 
around the table, honestly, you cannot follow with the 
same degree of attention 28 speakers.  You cannot.  So 
you have to concentrate on what comes as an initiative 
from the Presidency and the Commission.  The central 
role of the Commission is, indeed, reinforced.  And it 
is reinforced also because of the new member states: 
they look at the Commission as the honest broker and 
the fair partner.  So this is why the Commission gets, 
I think, more attention today and why the focal point 
dimension is reinforced.  
The dimension factor, from that point of view, works 
in favour of European decisions.  This is sometimes 
counterintuitive.  Some of the analysis that I’ve seen 
assumes that it is now much more difficult and much 
more complex because we are too many.  Yes and no. 
In a way, it is easier.  For instance, in the Commis-
sion itself:  in some ways decision-making is easier 
because to get a majority against a proposal is much 
more difficult.  Let’s put this frankly and put this almost 
mathematically:  if you have around the table 12 or 27, 
if one makes a proposal it is easier to have a minority 
against – a strong minority against – if you are 12 than 
if you are 27.  So if a member of the Commission comes 
with a proposal that is supported by the President of 
the Commission, to find a strong majority that objects is 
very difficult.  Paradoxically, it is easier to take a decision 
now.  So far, we have not had a single vote during the 
present Commission – but that is another story.  To tell 
you the truth, I believe the same reinforced role applies 
to the Council.  The European Council has become a 
more decisive institution in terms of orientation, giving 
impulse, putting things in motion.  It may also become 
easier to take decisions in the Council at the level of 
Heads of State and Government, particularly if the 
Presidency and Commission work well together.  
But the role of the Commission is being reinforced 
now, with 27, compared with previous years.  It is true 
that we have had some rough history and in the past 
there were some problems that, honestly, were used by 
some to undermine the very authority of the Commis-
sion.  Of course, I’m not best to judge this – I am not 
speaking here as someone who is politically objective 
– but when I make a serious introspection and look at 
the role of the Commission, then I believe it’s the real 
‘stable’ power in the European Union.  Precisely be-
cause we now have more countries in the EU, we need 
to reinforce the institutions.  It’s a systemic demand.  Of 
course, we need to see afterwards what is the concrete 
outcome in terms of issues.  But systemically I think the 
role of the Commission is reinforced by enlargement.  
JP:
One of the most important works on European integra-
tion is Andrew Moravcsik’s The Choice for Europe, an 
excerpt from which you have read.  Following Moravc-
sik, do you think European integration can be explained 
as a result of rational choices made by national political 
leaders?
JMB:
First of all, I know the works of Moravcsik and have 
met him personally once.  I think he has made a very 
interesting contribution both to EU studies as well as 
the debate about Europe.  And not just with his book 
but also a number of articles, including a very inter-
esting one that I remember in particular in Prospect 
magazine about the constitutional settlement.  I want 
to congratulate him not just for his academic work but 
also his contribution to the debate.  Now, if you ask me 
if I’m an intergovernmentalist or a supranationalist, I 
think we have both.  If I understand him correctly, I think 
Prof Moravcsik’s point of view is that we have rational 
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choices and institutional rational choices.  It starts with 
national preference formation, then interstate bargain-
ing followed by institutional choice…
JP:
Good student!
JMB:
…but he explicitly says that he prefers to speak about a 
framework instead of a model or theory.  This is certainly 
a very interesting perspective but it is not the perspec-
tive.  Why?  If I want to understand what’s going on 
about any subject at play in Europe, the logical place to 
start is to ask:  what does Germany or France or Britain 
want?  What does Portugal want?  There clearly is a 
system of national preference formation in each state, 
which is important to know and understand.  It affects 
how states negotiate with each other and how much 
and what kind of shaping of the result can be done by 
the EU institutions.  That is a point of observation, and 
very interesting one from a realist or classic interna-
tional relations point of view.  From that perspective, it 
is probably the most accurate.  
But we can also take another perspective.  We can 
also think systemically – we can look at the system 
and ask how it integrates contradictory demands.  The 
problem with the choice of perspective, as you know, is 
that the perspective also creates sometimes the topic, 
the subject, the language, the discourse – this is one 
of the problems we have in social sciences generally. 
The choice of terminology is not neutral, is never pure. 
That is why we need to take different perspectives and 
to have intellectual mobility.  For me, as a scientific or 
academic work, the book of Moravcsik brings me more 
knowledge and brings to my attention factors that I had 
not understood or thought about.  From that point of 
view, Moravcsik’s work is inspiring.  But if you ask me my 
view of what academic concept tells us the most about 
political and social reality, it is the idea of unintended 
consequences.  I think it was Weber who said there is a 
very important fact of life in politics, and that is that the 
final result very rarely corresponds to original intentions. 
And in the EU, this is even more true.  If one country 
wants something, it has a strategy.  But that strategy 
often conflicts (or may correspond with) 26 other strate-
gies.  And the Commission and Parliament also have 
their strategies – and even inside the institutions, there 
are even different strategies.  Take the European Par-
liament – you have committees within the EP that are 
highly autonomous, such as the budgetary committee. 
So we are talking about a highly differentiated, highly 
complex, multi-layered system of decision-making in 
which it is almost a miracle when we arrive at a final 
outcome or resolution that is exactly as it was originally 
planned.  The EU lacks a clear system of leadership. 
There is no directoire, there are only shifting coalitions. 
I prefer to look at the EU as a very complex reality or 
system in which governments make what they believe 
to be rational choices but that afterwards enter into a 
highly complex system of unintended consequences 
and feedback, and in which the institutions themselves 
have a lot of autonomy.  
One of the other articles talks about the autonomy 
of the institutions – the Pollack article – and from my 
own experience, the EU’s institutions are far more au-
tonomous than institutionalist theory (much of it focused 
on the American institutions) would lead one to believe. 
Much, much more.  Of course, we are acting in a sys-
tem in which the member states are the most powerful 
stakeholders.  I’m too young to write my memoires, 
but I have already had  some of the heads of state or 
government asking me or pressuring me, saying you 
have to do this, and we did exactly the opposite….
JP:
Can’t wait for that book!
JMB:
We are independent.  And the institutions are more 
independent than people usually think.  Take the ex-
ample of DG Competition, and its well established track 
record of independence.  The level of sophistication 
and autonomy is straight out of Almond and Verba. 
They consider that the level of autonomy of the system 
(amongst other things) is a signal of development.  From 
that point of view, the Commission is one of the most 
developed political and administrative systems in the 
world.  The Pollack article is very interesting where it 
speaks of the ‘in theatre’ agent – I would suggest that 
we are actually more autonomous than this article 
suggests.  But of course we are working in a system in 
which the constraints exist systemically but afterwards 
in concrete decisions, the decision is to a large degree 
autonomous.
JP:
Is there any plausible rational choice explanation for 
the Reform Treaty?
JMB:
Yes, because of the costs of not having a Treaty.  One 
of the biggest reasons why we need a Treaty is to put 
to an end to all this discussion about the Treaty.  
JP:
So it is a rational thing to agree to end that discus-
sion.
JMB:
It is a rational thing.  There is, of course, one view held 
by those who were less enthusiastic about the Treaty 
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that ‘oh, the Treaty is not important, the important things 
are delivery for the citizens’. I agree, that’s part of my 
own discourse, about a Europe of results.  But precisely 
because of that:  please, help us solve it, because oth-
erwise we’re going to spend 4 more or 5 more years 
discussing the same institutional issues.  It’s a rational 
thing to have a Treaty.  Apart from that, I believe the 
Treaty we’ve agreed represents progress principally in 
terms of clarification of competences.   It is an improve-
ment on the current situation in terms of institutional 
decision-making, qualified majority voting, also in the 
external field if we create a high representative who is 
also Vice-President of the Commission, it will give us 
the opportunity to do precisely what others are asking 
of us:  to act more coherently globally as the EU.
John Peterson is a professor in the School of Social 
and Political Studies at the University of Edinburgh
INCLUSION IN LEADING DATABASE OF 
EXPERTISE ON
 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
UACES, the University Association for Con-
temporary European Studies,operates a suc-
cessful, multi-disciplinary and international 
on-line Directory of expertise on European 
integration, www.ExpertonEurope.com. Used 
by academics to find research contacts, and 
by both policy-makers and the media to find 
advisers on EU issues, it is a valuable resource. 
UACES would like to offer free inclusion in this 
directory to EUSA members, for a trial period 
lasting until December 2008. To join the direc-
tory for this free trial, email the EUSA office 
(eusa@pitt.edu).
uaces  - the University Association for Contemporary 
European Studies - has pioneered European Studies 
since 1969. Based at University College London, our 
members are drawn from across Europe and beyond. 
We are highly interdisciplinary (principally political sci-
ence, law, economics, history and sociology), and also 
have an active practitioner membership, for whom we 
are undertaking new initiatives such as our lunchtime 
seminar series in Brussels
In terms of research and networking opportunities, 
we have a new on-line Directory – www.ExpertonEu-
rope.com. This allows members to find research part-
ners, and also enables non-academics to trace experts 
on particular issues when they need advice. 
Our Annual Research Conference is a major aca-
demic event: the 2007 conference in Portsmouth at-
tracted roughly 230 delegates from 22 countries, and in 
recent years the conference has been held in Hungary, 
Croatia and Ireland. The 2008 venue is Edinburgh; the 
2009 venue is Angers, in France’s magnificent Loire 
Valley.
We also fund conferences, workshops and study 
groups, considering bids three times annually. Our 
Scholarships programme enables scholars, and par-
ticularly research students, to undertake fieldwork in 
a country other than their place of domicile. Our work 
with the graduate student community is deepened by 
and through our Student Forum, which focuses on both 
Introducing UACES: Europe’s Leading 
European Studies Association
research and professional development.
Finally, UACES publications offer a range of op-
portunities to both established and up-and-coming 
scholars to share their research findings. JCMS: Journal 
of Common Market Studies, of course, is a UACES 
journal, but there is also the Contemporary European 
Studies book series with Routledge and the Journal of 
Contemporary European Research, an on-line peer-
reviewed journal.
Regular reports on UACES activities (with features 
on research, events, issues for the profession, details 
of EU funded research networks and projects, new pub-
lications and the Student Forum) can be found in our 
quarterly newsletter, UACES News. Both back copies 
of this and more information about future events, can 
be found at www.uaces.org. 
I very much hope to welcome you to a UACES event 
in the future, and wish all EUSA members a successful 
academic year 2007-8.
Alex Warleigh-Lack
Chair, UACES 
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EUSA Law
Interest Section Essays
Jurist Social Movements in Europe: 
The Role of Euro-Law Associations in
 European Integration (1953-1975)1 
Karen J. Alter
it is well established that the European Court of Justice 
transformed the original European Community legal 
system through the creation of revolutionary legal doc-
trines, and that this transformation created the bases for 
the ECJ’s expanded political role in European politics 
(Weiler 1991; Burley and Mattli 1993; Alter 2001). This 
essay contextualizes these well-known legal devel-
opments, arguing that the isolated  “entrepreneurs” 
discussed in the literature are really part of a transna-
tionally connected social movement. I argue that the 
jurists movement contributed three elements to legal 
integration in Europe: 1) the jurist movement created 
cases the ECJ could use for institutional development; 
2) being part of a movement emboldened individual ac-
tors because it reassured them that others would play 
their part in promoting legal integration; 3) the move-
ment created the appearance of momentum, which 
muted critics. I then examine legal integration absent a 
social movement by examining the ECJ’s separated at 
birth twin—the Andean Community Tribunal of Justice. 
I conclude by speculating that transnational law may 
need social movements to flourish.
1. National Euro-law Associations and the Fé-
dération Internationale de Droit Européen (F.I.D.E.)- 
1952- 1975
Euro-law associations formed in each European 
Community member state in the 1950s up through 
1961.2  Their nearly simultaneous emergence was not 
directly coordinated, but it was a natural outgrowth of 
practices within national legal communities, given Euro-
pean diplomacy in the 1940s and 1950s. Lawyers had 
been actively involved in national and international legal 
developments in the 1940s and 1950s. Antonin Cohen 
and Mikael Rask Madson note that many ties held this 
“European legal field” together— members had been 
active in the resistance, worked together in national 
governmental ministries, participated in the construc-
tion of the legal order for the Council of Europe, and 
participated in drafting the United Nations Charter, the 
Council of Europe, and the European Coal and Steel 
Community (Madsen and Vauchez 2005). 
Forming an organization dedicated to a particular 
legal topic was hardly novel and in some respects the 
activities undertaken by Euro-law associations were 
within the normal range for the European legal profes-
sion. But Euro-law associations had a specific political 
objective of promoting the larger European project of 
integration (which included the work of the Council of 
Europe). The French Association Française des Ju-
ristes Européen (AJE’s) stated goal was to “help those 
outside of the organization understand the necessity 
of creating Europe and to identify the role jurists can 
and must play in the creation of a United Europe.”3  The 
common objectives united the members into a largely 
homogenous “policy community” all working in the same 
direction (Schepel and Wesseling 1997).
Euro-law associations were immediately successful 
in organizational terms. In a relatively short period of 
time national associations attracted an active group 
of participants which included important legal and 
political figures. The Wissentschaftliche Gesellschaft 
für Europarecht (WGE) reached 200 to 300 members 
by the early 1960s,4  with a core membership of 30-40 
practioners including academics, in house lawyers for 
large corporations, members of European and national 
governmental institutions, and interested professionals. 
By 1963 the AJE had seventy active members, including 
an Avocat General of the ECJ and the Secretary of the 
European Commission on the Rights of Man (Maurice 
Lagrange), 34 lawyers, 11 French judges, 5 members 
of the Conseil d’État, 8 professors of law, the president 
of the Tribunal de commerce de la Seine, and a variety 
of notoraries from government and the private sector 
(Vauchez 2007b). In Belgium association meetings also 
regularly drew fifty participants.5  With financial support 
from the European Commission, organizations were 
able to host a number of conferences which were well 
attended. Hans Peter Ipsen identifies forty-one scholarly 
meetings of the WGE, FIDE and a number of institutes 
from 1961 to 1973 (Ipsen 1972).
Scholarly associations became fonts for briefs about 
European legal developments. Within a little more than 
a year of the ECJ’s seminal Van Gend en Loos decision 
scholars published at least 13 notes in national legal 
publications discussing the ruling, many if not all of 
which were written by association members. That there 
were so many legal venues to report in is already a sign 
of the existing legal infrastructures European law asso-
ciations could use to their advantage. With seed money 
from the Commission, associations founded European 
law journals including: Rivista di dirritto europeo (1961), 
Common Market Law Review (1964)—Cahiers de droit 
européen (1965), Revue trimestrielle de droit Européen 
(1965), Europarecht (1966).6  The journals provided a 
venue for discussion of European legal issues (includ-
ing human rights law). 
The longer essay documents the extensive Com-
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mission strategies to facilitate the work of Euro-law as-
sociations, efforts that allowed associations to be more 
active than they otherwise could have been. Commis-
sion and ECJ outreach efforts also lent momentum to 
Euro-law social movements. ECJ Justices’ participation 
in association events gave an insider air of importance 
to meetings.  Association members could learn about 
new legal developments before they were known, query 
Commission officials regarding their interpretations of 
the law, and get a sense of what types of cases would 
be helpful for the ECJ. Members could also offer opin-
ions on developing doctrine, and thus see themselves 
as part of a larger historical moment.  Through these 
connections, and the prodding of members of Commu-
nity institutions, association members were encouraged 
and inspired to take their project into their offices, and 
thus to directly participate in the process of European 
legal integration.
2. The Impact of Euro-Law Social Movements 
On European Legal Integration
Jurist social movements facilitated legal integra-
tion. It was not so much in the ideas these associa-
tions advocated, which were never fully embraced by 
outsiders (Alter 2001), but rather the cumulative effect 
achieved as Association members used their offices to 
aid the building of a European legal system. Because 
members were writing, litigating, or judging in their 
individual capacities, many have referred to Euro-law 
pioneers as “legal entrepreneurs.” Such a view under-
estimates the importance of individuals being part of 
a larger movement. Working together as associations 
contributed three concrete elements to promoting legal 
integration.
1. Creating test cases for the ECJ to use to develop 
legal doctrine. The vast majority of cases referred to the 
ECJ in the 1960s concerned the complicated formula 
for calculating social security benefits for migrant work-
ers and the classification of customs categories. These 
spontaneous cases were not per se helpful in building 
the ECJ’s authority as an important legal and political 
actor.  The references asking constitutional questions, 
and thus provoking rulings of doctrinal significance, took 
orchestration by association members.
The longer paper documents how many of the early 
legal integration rulings were created, framed, or argued 
by pro-Europe association members. It also shows how 
the Commission helped mobilize lawyers and build 
support for substantive European Community rules by 
calling for input on draft legislation for a variety of legal 
issues—common patent rules, tax rules, agricultural 
policies, trade in services etc. The Commission also 
used association meetings to leak to lawyers details 
of the compromises it made. For example, the ECJ’s 
Lütticke ruling came from an infringement suit that the 
Commission had settled out of court.7  The same situa-
tion occurred a number of years later where a German 
lawyer had been told that the Commission had settled 
a case involving the French liqueur Annisette, even 
though Commission officials believed the German law 
in question remained illegal. Gert Meier, the in-house 
counsel for Rewe Zentrale, worked with food industries 
to find cases that would work. He simply changed the 
type of liqueur and brought his own test case, which 
ultimately became the ECJ’s famous Cassis de Dijon 
decision establishing the legal precedent of mutual 
recognition. In total Meier brought twelve cases that 
were ultimately referred to the ECJ. Meier estimated 
that national judges referred only 10% of the cases 
where he argued that European law was relevant. 
But, where Meier’s goal was to have a case referred 
to the ECJ, Meier estimated that he succeeded ninety 
percent of the time because he would bring the case 
to sympathetic judges.  Sometimes judges even asked 
Meier to find cases to address issues.  These types of 
requests, he noted, usually were made at FIDE, WGE 
and Gesellschaft für Lebensmittel conferences.8  
2. Associations served as the ECJ’s kitchen cabi-
net, inspiring and emboldened association members. 
The term “kitchen cabinet” refers to President Andrew 
Jackson’s practice of circumventing his real cabinet (the 
one approved by the Senate) to instead plan policy with 
like-minded friends. National associations served this 
function, bringing together like-minded individuals who 
were in positions to facilitate legal integration.  Work-
ing collectively was especially important given that the 
ECJ’s revolutionary doctrines cut against prevailing 
international law interpretations, and given that in the 
1960s national political leaders were challenging the 
supranational aspects of European integration. 
It took not only audacity and courage, but also a 
sense that one’s behavior would gain broader support 
for the ECJ to issue its Van Gend and Costa rulings. 
Hans-Jürgen Rabe recalled a conference in Vienna, 
shortly after the ECJ’s Van Gend en Loos decision 
where conversation kept returning to the Van Gend rul-
ing. Even though the Advocat Général in the case had 
pointed out that a finding that European law created di-
rect effects implied that European law was also supreme 
to national law, Rabe recalls that the ECJ’s president 
André Donner vigorously denied the link between direct 
effect and supremacy. Rabe interpreted Donner’s denial 
as an effort by the ECJ to tread carefully. Inspired by 
the exchange, the WGE’s leadership put the issue of 
supremacy on the agenda for its next meeting, held 
July 10, 1964. The date proved highly fortuitous. On 
24 June 1964, just two and a half weeks before the 
WGE’s conference, the ECJ’s Advocat Général Maurice 
8     Fall  2007   EUSA Review
Legrange made his oral argument on the Costa case. 
Lagrange supported what was a fairly widespread posi-
tion that national judges should find ways within their 
constitutions to give effect to European law, or national 
governments should change constitutions to facilitate 
legal integration (Ipsen 1964). At the July 10 meeting, 
Ipsen critiqued Lagrange’s widely shared perspective, 
urging instead that ECJ judges should find that the 
Treaty of Rome itself implied European law supremacy. 
The advantage of this interpretation was that the Treaty 
of Rome was already part of national law.  Also, basing 
EC law supremacy on the Treaty ensured that the origin 
of the supremacy doctrine was uniform and independent 
from national constitutional limitations. Rabe notes that 
three European judges were at the meeting “listening 
with red ears,” wanting to know if the leading academics 
of EC law would accept Ipsen’s argument.  Five days 
later, the ECJ issued its famous Costa ruling, going 
beyond LaGrange’s argument to base the supremacy 
of European law in the Treaty of Rome.9 
3. Creating the perception of a momentum in fa-
vor of European legal integration. European law was 
more frequently ignored than followed in the 1960s 
and 1970s. National judges unaffiliated to Euro-law 
movements were reluctant to refer cases to the ECJ, 
there were national high court rulings that seemed to 
contradict ECJ doctrine, and the common market ob-
jectives of a free movement of goods, services, capital 
and people remained a distant dream. Euro-law move-
ments sought to change the legal perception regarding 
European integration while the political will and thus 
the political reality of European integration lagged. 
The longer paper returns to some of the early national 
cases that were never referred to the ECJ, showing 
how these cases represent association members us-
ing their office to create salient pro-Europe national 
legal rulings. Pro-Europe national court decisions were 
trumpeted by European officials and legal scholars as 
signs that the European legal system was beginning to 
take hold. Really, what was happening is that activists 
were creating cases that could then be pointed to as 
signs of progress. Pro-European decisions were then 
lauded in the scholarly press.  The overall effect was 
intimidating.  
German judge Helmut Friedl was not a member of 
the WGE. As a tax judge, Friedl believe he was obliged 
to refer to the ECJ questions that concerned European 
tax directives. Friedl said that the supremacy doctrine 
crept up on national judges who did not pay much at-
tention to the ECJ’s rulings or the pro-Europe doctrine. 
Friedl was aware of the ECJ’s Costa decision, but he 
emphasized that the ECJ had said that the ruling applied 
as far as European law was concerned. But by 1970 
there was a “governing opinion” in the literature sup-
porting EC law supremacy. Judges, he said, avoided the 
criticism that would come with contradicting the govern-
ing opinion by sidestepping the issue, which was easy 
to do since few cases involved an issue of European 
law supremacy. Friedl also observed that after 1968 
there was not nearly as much literature challenging 
the supremacy doctrine, surmising that authors were 
avoiding being labeled “anti-European.”10  
3. Imagining Legal Integration Without Jurist 
Associations—The Case of the Andean Community 
Tribunal of Justice11   
If a tree falls in the forest, does anyone know?  Ab-
sent Euro-law associations, ECJ decisions would have 
been trees that fell largely without notice.  There also 
would have been fewer big trees felled in the 1960s, 
and thus less to fill treatises about European law. A 
brief comparison with the Andean Court of Justice—the 
ECJ’s twin—reveals how a lack of social movement 
support inhibits supranational doctrinal development.  
The Andean Community Tribunal of Justice (ACJ) 
was created in 1981, twelve years after the creation of 
the Andean Pact.  The ACJ was explicitly modeled on 
the ECJ, including among other similarities an infringe-
ment process and a preliminary ruling mechanism 
(Keener 1987). Andean legal integration was in some 
ways advantaged in that all member states shared a 
common language and the ACJ had the model of the 
ECJ to emulate. But the ACJ has lacked cases raising 
significant constitutional legal issues, Andean law has 
been slow to penetrate national legal systems, and the 
ACJ has itself been timid about asserting its authority 
or developing significant legal doctrines. 
The ACJ initially lacked cases. In the 1980s member 
states refused to authorize the Andean legal secretariat 
to proceed with cases, even the type of technical non-
controversial cases the European Commission raised 
in the 1960s. The ACJ received some preliminary ruling 
references, which it used to put forth broad principles. 
In a 1987 preliminary ruling decision (1-IP-87) the ACJ 
explained the preliminary ruling process, and using 
terminology that was nearly identical to the ECJ’s it 
asserted that Andean rules created direct effects and 
are supreme to national rules. Its decision 2-IP-88 
explicitly embraced the ECJ’s Costa and Simmenthal 
jurisprudence. Neither ruling turned on these assertions, 
rather the ACJ took the opportunities of cases to instruct 
Andean courts on the legal system, using the ECJ’s 
language to insist that the relevant national agencies 
were required to refer cases and enforce Andean rules. 
The ACJ followed with numerous other decisions where 
it reasserted these principles within the ruling—though 
none of the cases actually turned on constitutional is-
sues related to the ACJ’s pronouncements. 
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The Andean doctrines fell into almost complete si-
lence. One can find a few articles on the Andean legal 
system, almost all of which are penned by lawyers with 
degrees in Europe or the United States where publish-
ing articles is part of a scholarly professional life (Rodri-
guez Lemmo 2002; Baquero-Herrera 2004; Tremolada 
2006). Given the lack of scholarship, one presumes that 
there are few means or benefits associated with publish-
ing articles about Andean jurisprudence.  The result is 
that the Andean legal system is largely unknown within 
larger national legal and political systems.
In Europe, EEC officials were a large source for 
scholarship on legal integration. ACJ judges and 
members of the legal secretariat have written articles, 
but mainly for books commemorating their years on 
the Court. Some have written Treaties on Andean law, 
but legal writings are short on doctrinal analysis, and 
they are technocratic, including mostly legal texts and 
descriptions of rules and processes. Andean officials 
have also taught courses on Andean integration at lo-
cal universities, but they haven’t created a burgeoning 
field of integration studies populated by their students. 
Andean officials have also served as lawyers bringing 
cases involving Andean law. But Andean actors have 
largely failed to connect to broader legal and political 
interests in Andean polities.
This different context changes how the actors 
perceive and play their roles. Gallo Pico Mantilla was 
President of the ACJ when the court first asserted the 
supremacy of Andean rules (1987), and he served 
on the ACJ until at least 1992. A gentleman-politician 
lawyer, Mantilla sought to emulate the European legal 
integration strategy. Mantilla was committed to Andean 
integration as an end in itself, having been a participant 
in negotiations involving Andean integration and in 
the founding of the Andean Court. As President of the 
ACJ, Mantilla probably penned the 1-IP-87 ruling, and 
he wrote a Treatise on Andean Law published in 1992. 
Mantilla helped convince the first Ecuadorian courts 
to start making references to the ACJ. Mantilla was 
an integration activist, but he had few interlocutors to 
work with.
Juan Vincente Ugarte del Pino is more typical of 
appointments to the ACJ. Ugarte del Pino was the 
Peruvian judge on the Andean court from 1990-1995, 
overlapping at least two years with Mantilla. Ugarte del 
Pino came from the judiciary in Peru where serving as 
a diplomat of the law is not a common practice, but he 
had taught a course on Andean integration and wrote a 
treatise on the Peruvian constitution. Ugarte del Pino did 
not put his energy into the Andean integration system. 
For example, he did not work to educate the Peruvian 
judiciary on their responsibility to refer cases to the ACJ, 
nor did he write any treatises on the Andean system 
for Peruvian lawyers and judges. To some extent, his 
lack of energy is understandable. Uguarte del Pino re-
counted the basic struggles he faced as a judge on the 
Andean Court—since the Ecuadorian government did 
not supply a building, judges had to spend time finding 
a building to work in. Andean judges lacked a staff or a 
system of Avocat General to help them analyze legal 
issues or draft decisions, and early on the Andean court 
spent time dealing with labor disputes from employees 
whose contracts were never fulfilled because promised 
resources were not supplied by Andean governments. 
The picture one gets is of a judge lacking the basic 
means to do his job.12  Time has overcome these logis-
tical difficulties, but still ACJ judges remain relatively 
inactive legal diplomats. 
The lack of a larger movement perhaps contributes 
to making the ACJ less bold than its European coun-
terpart. The ACJ’s 1-IP-87 preliminary ruling decision 
was written in bold terms, but the ACJ has hesitated to 
innovate through legal doctrine or to encourage more 
entrepreneurial legal behavior by lawyers and national 
judges.  It seldom rewards litigants who try to use the 
Andean system to challenge national practices. This 
is in part because the ACJ has defined the division of 
labor between national and Andean jurisdictions much 
more narrowly than its European counterpart, refus-
ing to suggest the implication of Andean law and ACJ 
doctrine for national law or for the case at hand. This 
interpretive style makes ACJ rulings abstract and largely 
unhelpful to lawyers and litigants, and it limits the legal 
and political significance of ACJ doctrine. 
The ACJ also shies from being interpretively bold 
when it comes to its own jurisdiction and authority. The 
ACJ’s ruling of 2-IP-90 refuses to assert a doctrine of 
implied powers—ruling instead that where Andean 
rules are not clear or complete, legal and political au-
thority resides at the national level. In 3-IP-93 the ACJ 
made it clear that states cannot modify duty levels of 
products included in the Free Trade Program, but it 
left for national courts the task of examining reserva-
tions and exceptions lists to determine if a product is 
included in the Free Trade Program. When in 1999 the 
Peruvian intellectual property agency INDECOPI asked 
the ACJ to consider a legal question sent by itself, the 
ACJ refused because INDECOPI was not part of the 
Peruvian judiciary. In refusing this case, the ACJ shut 
off an avenue for requests involving Peru—and indeed 
it took until 2005 for Peruvian courts to start regularly 
sending references to the ACJ. In Decision 87-IP-2002 
the Andean Court excluded from its jurisdiction practices 
that, even though restrictive, do not create external ef-
fects involving other member states.
Many elements keep Andean judges from more as-
sertively developing and expanding their authority. The 
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ACJ and the whole Andean integration process remain 
under-resourced. The ACJ’s narrower interpretations 
may well be the intent of member states, written more 
clearly into Andean legislation. Most Andean coun-
tries also lack powerful constitutional courts that are 
willing and able to challenge political authority. Some 
of these limitations existed in Europe in the 1960s 
too. It is easy to forget that European founding states 
were all civil law countries, formally committed to the 
principle that judicial rulings apply only to the case at 
hand, and with limited traditions of judicial review. While 
European Treaties were more ambiguous than Andean 
law, providing lacunae the ECJ could and did exploit, 
the ambiguity existed because the international legal 
practice of the time expected that powers not clearly 
transferred to international bodies resided in national 
jurisdictions. The ECJ broke out of the legal tradition of 
its time. Being embedded within a broader movement of 
national jurists who were willing to challenge the status 
quo through aggressive legal interpretations helped the 
ECJ, providing test cases it could use and reassuring 
justices that audacious pro-integration rulings would 
be well received. 
I do not mean to suggest that there are no social 
movements for law in the Andean context or that there 
are no significant ACJ rulings. One can find social 
movements in a few areas of law. The Comisión Andina 
de Juristas (not linked to Andean integration or the 
Andean Community per se)13  is a transnational social 
movement of jurists using law to promote principles for 
democracy and the security of human rights and devel-
opment.14  It is interesting to note that unlike Europe, 
the objectives of promoting the rule of law, democracy, 
security and development do not seem to be ideologi-
cally attached to the Andean integration project per se. 
There are also human rights movements in the Andean 
context.  And indeed the Colombia Constitutional Court, 
created in 1991, has issued a number of doctrinally and 
politically bold decisions, many of which are related to 
the Inter-American Human Rights system.  But the only 
area where there significant legal and political devel-
opments through Andean Community legal integration 
is in the area of intellectual property, where the World 
Intellectual Property Organization has long facilitated 
trans-national exchanges and supported the activities 
of national legal actors involved in intellectual property 
issues. 
External factors led to the reinvigoration of the 
Andean integration process in the mid 1990s, at which 
point the General Secretariat was far more willing to 
pursue infringements. Where Andean rules are clear, 
the ACJ has been willing to assert its authority, even 
in the face of political counter-pressures. The ACJ has 
issued over 1200 rulings, including ruling on over 60 
infringement cases, and its rulings are generally fol-
lowed. But the lack of a jurist social movement attached 
to the integration process Andean Court’s continues 
to keep Andean legal doctrine underdeveloped and 
largely unknown beyond the few insiders who work in 
the system or who are involved in intellectual property 
law litigation.15  
4. Does Transnational Law Need Social Move-
ments to Flourish?
It is well established that social movements use 
litigation domestically and internationally to promote 
their causes (Harlow and Rawlings 1992; Cichowski 
2007), and that cause-lawyers actively promote political 
agendas (Sarat and Scheingold 2001). It is also well 
established that EC officials have been quite entrepre-
neurial in their strategies to promote European integra-
tion.  This article’s contribution is to connect the pieces 
to think about how social movements matter in the 
creation of bold legal doctrine, and in the incorporation 
of international rules within domestic legal systems. This 
analysis suggests that building a rule of law requires 
more than information and opinion exchange. In Europe, 
jurist social movements connected actors personally, 
ideologically, and strategically. The comparison to the 
Andean context suggests that social movement support 
may be a necessary condition for international legal 
systems to flourish.
Euro-Associations also benefited from the post-
WWII historical moment that allowed association 
members to believe they were part of a larger project 
of building peace. The historical moment also brought 
in judges, scholar and practioners uncommitted to Eu-
ropean integration per se. The ECJ’s project dovetailed 
synergistically with national level legal and political 
evolution of the times. In the 1960s European legal 
communities were committed to overcoming the WWII 
past where judges were shamefully complicit actors 
aiding Nazi regimes. European governments were 
constructing an administrative state apparatus to direct 
national economies, and European legal communities 
were building in tandem the authority of the judiciary to 
review the actions of government bodies. The ECJ’s 
project fit nicely with this larger trend, as it extended 
to the supranational arena changes taking place at the 
national level (Lindseth 2002; Bignami 2005).
Euro-law associations are not unique in the his-
tory of international law. As Antoine Vauchez, Antonin 
Cohen, Guillaume Sacriste, and Mikael Rask Madsen 
have shown, the actors in Euro-law associations were 
part of larger movements promoting international law in 
the twentieth century. Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth 
have also noted how groups of lawyers influenced 
international legal developments in Latin America and 
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beyond (Dezalay and Garth 2002). Given recent inter-
national legal developments, one suspects that there 
are movements of lawyers—in Europe and beyond—
that are formally or informally working to promote the 
development of international criminal law, international 
human rights law, international environmental codes, 
the dissemination of best practices for economic and 
political transparency in governance, and the develop-
ment of more complete international trade laws. It would 
be interesting to compare these movements, to better 
understand their roles in building transnational law. One 
cannot know from a single case, but it may well be that 
transnational law succeeds only where there are social 
networks to facilitate them, something which requires an 
infrastructure and perhaps even an historical moment 
to facilitate the larger enterprise.
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Notes
 1.  This essay is excerpted from a longer article prepared for 
a conference on The Historical Roots of European Legal 
Integration, Copenhagen.
 2.  National associations include: Wissentschaftliche Gesell-
schaft für Europarecht, Association Belge pour le Droit 
Européen, Association Français des Juristes Européen, 
Associazione Italian dei Giuristi Europei, Association 
Luxembourgeois des Juristes Européen, Nederlandse 
Vereniging voor Europees Recht. The Commission 
helped establish the umbrella Fédération International 
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pour le de Droit Européen (FIDE).
 3.  Stated in a 1994 publication about the AJE. On file with 
the author.
 4.  Based on an interview with Hans-Jürgen Rabe, the 
Secretary of the WGE, Brussels, January 11 1994. By 
1990 it had 516 members, sixty percent of which were 
practioners and forty percent scholars. See: (Ipsen 1990) 
At p. 335
 5.  Interview with Michel Gaudet, Director of the Legal Ser-
vices of the European Commission (195801970) 7 July 
1994, Brussels.
 6.  Vauchez notes that association members had a wide 
variety of backgrounds and interests. (Vauchez 2007b, 
2007a)
 7.  In the Lütticke hearing, the German government argued 
that the Commission had dropped the infringement suit 
after the Bundestag lowered the tax in question, which 
proved that Germany was now in compliance with Euro-
pean law. Rejecting the German government’s argument, 
the ECJ found the German law in question violated the 
Treaty of Rome, creating a legal basis for private actors 
to challenge national taxes that functioned like tariffs.T 
his ruling ultimately led to the German Constitutional 
Court’s ruling supporting the supremacy of European law. 
Lütticke (Alfons) GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Saarlouis, ECJ 
case 57/65, [1966] ECR 205.  For more on the “turnover 
tax” debate in Germany, see: (Alter 2001) At p. 80-86.
 8.  Interview with Gert Meier, the in house lawyer for Rewe 
Zentrale, Cologne, 26 April 1993. For more on this caes 
see: (Alter and Meunier-Aitsahalia 1994) 
 9.  Interview with Dr. Hans Jürgen Rabe, Secretary of the 
WGE, Brussels, January 11 1994.
10.  Interview with Dr. Helmut Friedl, former Judge at Finan-
zgericht München, Clerk at the Bundesfinanzhof from 
1967-1972. 22 February 1994, Füßen.
 11.  This section is based on ongoing research conducted 
in collaboration with Laurence Helfer and Maria Florencia 
Guerzovich.  
 12.  Interview with Uguarte del Pino, Lima Peru, 22 June 
2007. 
 13.  The Comisión includes geographically proximate 
Andean countries, including Chile and Venezuela which 
withdrew from the Andean integration project. Its stated 
mission is to work within the region to promote a rule of 
law and the principles for democracy and the security of 
human rights and development.  
 14. This organization is hardly well known, but one could 
easily have said the same for Euro-law movements in 
the 1960s and 1970s.
 15. Karen Alter, Maria Florencia Guerzovich and Laurence 
Helfer are researching the ACJ’s role in intellectual prop-
erty disputes in the Andean region.  The ACJ has forced 
governments to renounce agreements with the United 
States, and it has reinforced Andean legal positions 
against the strong pressure of transnational pharmaceuti-
cal agencies. 
Karen J. Alter is an associate professor in the Department 
of Political Science at Northwestern University.
EUSA Political Economy 
Interest Section Essay
When Small States Get Larger
Erik Jones1 
we are used to taking as read that globalization is mak-
ing states smaller. With the expansion in trade and 
capital flows, national governments are increasingly 
unable to control domestic macroeconomic conditions 
and national firms have ever less influence on market 
prices. Of course some countries remain global actors 
and others seek to assert a more prominent world 
role. Similarly, even the smallest countries can spawn 
world-class firms. Still the exceptions only confirm the 
rule. The expansion of global finance and commerce 
condemns most countries to shrink.
 Being small is not all that bad. For some countries 
at least, small is beautiful. With cohesive societies and 
consensual governments, a few of the small countries 
in Western Europe have managed to mark up impres-
sive gains over time. The governments of these small 
countries not only have generated huge improvements 
in income per capita, but they also have succeeded 
in encouraging firms to specialize in relatively secure 
(inelastic) niche markets and nurturing an impressive 
capacity for actors across the economy as a whole to 
engage in flexible adjustment in response to external 
shocks.
 Lasting success in the small states of Western 
Europe is not due to government action alone and it 
is no accident that the more successful states are the 
more cohesive and consensual ones. Rather the people 
in smaller states recognize their vulnerability to world 
market forces. They agree to overcome their differ-
ences. And they work together to build institutions for 
the collective management of economic performance. 
Some of these institutions help to steer the economy; 
others help to compensate those parts of society that 
fall off the rails.
 The more successful of the smaller West European 
states may even provide models for how other countries 
could adapt to the challenges of a global economic 
future. Given that the influence of globalization is mani-
fest, people should work together to strengthen national 
performance. Politics should be more inclusive than 
divisive and markets should be more flexible than rigid. 
Most important, countries of all sizes should avoid be-
coming obsessed with facile trade-offs between states 
and markets. Instead they should value equity as well 
as efficiency–because by doing so they have a real 
chance at achieving the best of both worlds.
 There is no easy teleology in this conventional 
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wisdom. On the contrary, and at its best, these insights 
were garnered through painstaking and original empiri-
cal research. Scholars like David Cameron (1978), Pe-
ter Katzenstein (1984, 1985), and Arendt Lijphart (1975, 
1984) helped students of comparative political economy 
to look at the world beyond the large pattern states and 
to avoid focusing too narrowly on the idiosyncracies of 
individual country cases. They used country-specific 
case study material, but they showed how this material 
could be transformed into more general and testable 
hypotheses. In turn, their work attracted the attention of 
scholars like Jelle Visser and Anton Hemerijck (1997), 
Paulette Kurzer (1993), and Herman Schwartz (1994), 
who scrutinized the link between size and success and 
who tried to strike the balance between fortune, policy 
and context, or–borrowing from Schwartz (2001)–luck, 
pluck or stuck.
 The resulting literature on the political economy of 
small states constitutes an impressive body of research 
with a much larger number of significant contributors 
than I have mentioned so far. When grafted onto a paral-
lel and complementary literature on patterns of welfare 
state development, it leaves very few stones unturned 
and most questions answered. The answers are not all 
complete and there is much contention (and therefore 
interest) in the field. Nevertheless, it is a branch of 
comparative political economy that has matured nicely. 
The only wonder is whether there is anything we can 
say that is new.
 Sometimes it is events rather than scholarship that 
point the way.  While we have developed a good under-
standing of small country success, the small countries 
themselves have been experiencing periodic bouts of 
turmoil. Sweden and Finland went through severe eco-
nomic downturns at the end of the Cold War. Denmark 
vetoed the Maastricht Treaty and Norway turned down 
European Union (EU) membership. Austria flirted with 
Joerg Haider’s Freedom Party and the Netherlands 
flirted with the List Pim Fortuyn. Switzerland has seen 
the growth of support for its right-wing people’s party 
and now Belgium is going through the most difficult 
government formation in recent memory. Indeed, there 
is real talk that Belgium might someday (not today, but 
someday) fall apart.
 These episodes are not all the same and there are 
clear differences from one country to the next. Neverthe-
less, there is a common theme that unites them as well: 
either they reflect problems that can be traced back to 
globalization writ large, or they reflect a breakdown in 
domestic consensus; usually there is some element of 
both.
 There is nothing surprising in the fact that the 
smaller countries of Western Europe have difficult mo-
ments. No-one ever suggested anything to the contrary. 
Bad things happen to all states, including the more suc-
cessful ones. The bouts of turmoil have not been fatal 
to the small country model either. On the contrary, in 
many cases the smaller states of Europe have quickly 
reclaimed their reputation for success. Still the fact that 
these things have happened suggests that we should 
know more about the relationship between external 
vulnerability and domestic consensus. By the same 
token, we should also know more about what it means 
to be small.
 There are two ways to square the circle.  One is to 
define the size of nations in terms of vulnerability and 
then show the link from vulnerability to consensus; the 
other is to define the size of nations in terms of homo-
geneity and then make the link from homogeneity to 
consensus to vulnerability.  Peter Katzenstein’s work 
goes down the first route.  Countries are small, therefore 
they are vulnerable and the recognition of that vulner-
ability fosters consensus (see also, Katzenstein 2003). 
Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spolaore (2005) go the op-
posite direction.  Countries are small, therefore they are 
homogenous.  Small, homogenous countries are not, 
however, self-sufficient.  As these small countries look 
outside their borders to find things they cannot provide 
for themselves (or to achieve economies of scale), they 
become dependent upon world markets and therefore 
vulnerable to world market influences.
 Both arguments offer important insights that help 
to explain small country success.  Katzenstein (2003) 
highlights the importance of awareness.  If people in 
small countries are not aware of their vulnerability they 
may ignore or overlook the advantages of consensus. 
Alesina and Spolaore (2005) underscore the role of 
diversity.  If small countries are not homogenous, then 
they may suffer from conflicting societal preferences 
which in turn may make it more difficult for these coun-
tries to engage with the outside world.
 At the juxtaposition of these insights, we can begin 
to speculate about the conditions under which small 
countries would experience failure rather than suc-
cess.  An easy formula would see small countries torn 
by domestic distributive conflict.  As different groups 
mobilize around sub-national identities, political elites 
might become more concerned with the struggles tak-
ing place at home than with the potential threat repre-
sented by market forces abroad.  In that situation, the 
country would not be flexible in responding to external 
shocks and may even break apart if enough pressure 
is brought to bear.  Belgium might be a good example, 
but we could also extend the argument to more extreme 
cases like Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia.  The point is 
not that Belgium is just like these other cases.  Rather, 
and more simply, it is that despite their populations size, 
geographic scale, dependence on world markets, etc., 
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none of these three countries reveals the advantages 
of being small.
 Still, small multi-ethnic countries are relatively ex-
ceptional in Western Europe.  Therefore, it would be 
useful to consider other possible negative scenarios 
as well.  A more complicated story might start with a 
perceived threat to national identity.  Such a threat 
could bring the country together, but it would be to reject 
rather than to embrace relations with the outside world. 
There would be consensus of sorts, but it would be 
of a different kind from that examined by Katzenstein 
or by Alesina and Spolaore.  For examples, we could 
look at populists like Fortuyn or extremists like Haider, 
not because the two are equivalent–they are not–but 
because each sought to mobilize the people against 
a threat to their identity emanating from the outside 
world.
 The point of such speculation is not to provide a new 
set of descriptive categories for current events.  There 
is plenty that has been written on the different small 
countries and any thumbnail sketch of events or indi-
viduals provides an oversimplification at best.  Rather, 
such speculation is useful because it suggests where 
we should focus attention in our analysis of the success 
and failure of small states.  How sure we can be that 
politicians and voters in small countries pay attention 
to the fact that their country is small rather than being 
distracted by something else?  Even if they are aware 
of their vulnerability and they choose to embrace world 
markets, can we be confident that world market forces 
will not encourage new political cleavages, enhancing 
domestic diversity and taking away the advantages of 
being small?  Of course, the question can be made 
simpler: Small West European countries have a tradi-
tion of political consensus, but what if that situation 
changes?
 Economic Adjustment and Political Transformation 
in Small States tries to suggest answers to these ques-
tions by focusing on the paired comparison of Belgium 
and the Netherlands.  The two countries are interesting 
for three reasons:
• Belgium and the Netherlands are extremely open to 
world market forces; 
• they have well established reputations for being both 
consensual and diverse; and,
• the political formula for managing diversity through 
consensus has changed significantly over time and 
with the breakdown in consociational democracy.
The analysis starts with an empirical question: “How 
did the break down of consociational democracy during 
the post-World War II period affect the ability of Belgian 
and Dutch policymakers to foster economic adjustment 
in response to external shocks?”  My prior assumption 
was that once the governments of the two countries lost 
the means to foster consensus through the traditional 
practices associated with consociational democracy, 
then they would lose much of their leverage over the 
economy as well.
 To appreciate the significance of the question it is 
necessary to introduce consociational democracy as the 
formula for consensus building in deeply fragmented 
societies.      In his general elaboration of the argument, 
Lijphart (1969) explained how different elements in 
society organize in vertical pillars that institutionalize 
social life from cradle to grave.  Each pillar is con-
trolled by a group of political and economic elites that 
command the loyalty and support for their followers. 
Ordinary members live their lives within the groups, 
sharing geographic space but not social interaction with 
members of other groups.  Meanwhile, elites must learn 
to cooperate across the pillars, making concessions 
to one another to avoid conflict breaking out between 
the groups.  The imperative in the word ‘must’ derives 
from the vulnerability of these deeply divided societies 
with respect to the outside world.  Elite cooperation in 
the consociational pattern helps to mitigate that vul-
nerability; any breakdown in consociationalism should 
therefore bring vulnerability to the external influences 
to the fore.
 What I found out was much more complicated than I 
first imagined.  The real world always is.  To begin with, 
I discovered what schoolchildren in both countries learn 
early on: there were important moments in the post-
World War II history of Belgium and the Netherlands 
when politicians in both countries turned away from 
cooperation or consensus-building long before conso-
ciationalism’s demise.  There were vertically integrated 
groups in society, but they did not work together in the 
common interest.  For Belgium, this went on almost 
without stop from the abdication of King Leopold III 
in 1951 to the end of the schools crisis in 1958.  As a 
result, the government’s control over the economy was 
weak and its desire to engage with the outside world 
was limited.  When Belgium joined the European Coal 
and Steel Community, for example, it demanded reas-
surance that it could leave again if domestic conditions 
required.  The story is a familiar to anyone who has read 
Alan Milward’s chapter on “coal and the Belgian nation”. 
Nevertheless it is important as an illustration of the limits 
of consensus building through consociationalism.  
 The Netherlands experienced moments of do-
mestic conflict as well.  They were not so prolonged 
as in Belgium, but they were enough to underscore 
that consensus is a practice that politicians choose to 
follow.  Given the right incentives political elites may 
also opt for conflict.  As a consequence, policymakers 
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in both countries learned early on that their ability to 
foster consensus depended upon their willingness to 
enforce what Dutch prime minister Willem Drees once 
ominously referred to as “the rules of the game”.
 The importance of elite cooperation and consensus-
building is most apparent when the focus is on the use of 
corporatist wage bargaining to implement price-incomes 
policy.  Here I will provide an abbreviated version of an 
argument that is much more lengthy and much less for-
malized in the book.  It starts with policy preferences for 
fixed exchange rates and open goods markets.  These 
preferences are not hypothetical or arbitrary; they are 
real.  Consecutive governments in Belgium and the 
Netherlands–right and left–reaffirmed their choice for 
both.  Other options were available.  Indeed the early 
postwar Dutch Finance Minister responsible for stabiliz-
ing the guilder, Pieter Lieftinck, was openly suspicious 
of the merits of free trade.  In the end, the advocates 
of fixed exchange rates and open markets won out. 
And, since the two countries are small in the economic 
sense of the word, this means that their traded goods 
prices and nominal interest rates are set abroad.  So 
the question is: How can macroeconomic policymakers 
influence the direction of the economy?
 The fact is that neither the Belgians nor the Dutch 
were eager to use fiscal policy for aggregate demand 
stabilization.  As with the promotion of free trade and 
fixed exchange rates, this aversion to Keynesian-style 
demand management  was by choice and not by neces-
sity.  The preference was due in part to the recognition 
that trade openness tends to mitigate the influence of 
government spending on aggregate demand and in 
part due to the fear that domestic capital markets were 
too small and foreign borrowing is too risky.  From one 
government to the next, politicians argued instead that 
fiscal deficits and government borrowing should be kept 
in check.  Eventually, however, events overtook these 
assertions. From the middle of the 1970s onward, the 
governments of Belgium and the Netherlands experi-
enced ever higher fiscal deficits and an exploding level 
of public debt.
 The deficits that Belgium and the Netherlands ex-
perienced in the 1970s were not some change of heart 
about the merits of Keynesian-style aggregate demand 
management.  They signaled a loss of control and not 
an attempt to reassert it.  With the rise in unemployment 
and the slowdown in economic activity, the welfare state 
institutions created to redistribute the burdens of trading 
with the outside world became a source of burden–and 
a drain on competitiveness–in their own right.
 Lacking confidence in the use of fiscal policy, the 
Belgians and the Dutch focused on the investment chan-
nel for aggregate demand stabilization.  So the ques-
tion has to be rephrased: Once having given up control 
over nominal interest rates, how can macroeconomic 
policymakers influence the level of investment?
 The answer can be sketched using a very simple 
investment function like the one found in Gregory 
Mankiw’s (2007: 492-493) popular textbook on mac-
roeconomics.  Firms invest when the net returns from 
adding to the capital stock exceed the cost of capital.  If 
we focus on capital-per-worker, these net returns equal 
the marginal product of capital (MPK) times the price 
of manufactures (Pm) less the nominal wages paid to a 
single worker (W).  Meanwhile the cost of capital (per 
worker) is the nominal interest rate (i) times the price 
of capital (Pk) less any change in the replacement cost 
(ΔPk) plus depreciation (δ) times the price of capital 
(δPk).  The difference between revenue and cost is 
the profit (Π) from making new investments.  When 
this profit is greater than zero, the firm will invest until 
the resulting decline in the marginal product of capital 
eliminates all profits.  When the profit is less than zero, 
the firm will allow its capital base to deteriorate until the 
marginal product of capital increases to bring things 
back into balance.  You can put everything together in 
a formula like equation [1].  And you can isolate the 
price of capital and divide by the general price level (P) 
to bring things into real terms in a formula like equation 
[2].
Π = (MPK*Pm - W) - (iPk - ΔPk + δPk)             [1]
Π / P = (MPK * [Pm / P] - [W / P]) - (Pk / P) * (i - [ΔPk / Pk] + δ) [2]
 This is where policy preferences become important. 
So long as nominal interest rates (i) are set abroad, 
the government cannot use them to raise or lower the 
level of business investment.  The fact that the country 
trades freely with the outside world means that the price 
of manufactures (Pm) are set abroad as well.  The same 
is true of the price of capital (Pk) since capital goods 
are manufactured and traded. By implication, the rate 
of capital price inflation (ΔPk / Pk )is set abroad as well. 
The rate of depreciation (δ) is not a policy instrument. 
The marginal product of capital (MPK) is a function of 
the supply of capital and labor and so it responds to 
the level of investment (or net capital change) rather 
than driving it.  That leaves only general prices (P) and 
nominal wages (W).  Relatively high domestic prices 
lower the relative cost of capital (Pk / P) and the real 
wage (W / P), but they also lower the relative price of 
manufactures (Pm / P) and therefore revenues.  Low 
prices have the opposite effect.  The only unambiguous 
instrument, therefore, is the nominal wage rate.
 If the governments of Belgium and the Nether-
lands want to stabilize macroeconomic performance 
by influencing the level of business investment, then 
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they have to control nominal wages.  But to control 
nominal wages, they have to win agreement from wage 
negotiators–meaning employers and trade unions.  In 
turn that means they also have to win control over 
prices.  While the impact of relatively high domestic 
prices on the incentives for investment are ambiguous 
(for the reasons sketch in the preceding paragraph), 
the impact of high prices on real wages (W/P) are not. 
Workers lose.  Therefore, they insist on using prices as 
a guide to wages and they will agree to moderate wage 
claims provided that prices changes will be moderate 
as well.  
 The trade-offs in price-incomes policy are well 
known.  Nevertheless, the implications for small coun-
tries like Belgium and the Netherlands bear repetition. 
So long as everyone agrees to set wages and prices 
to serve the common good (meaning to stabilize ag-
gregate demand), the government has a viable policy 
instrument.  When either employers or trade unions 
refuse to go along, the viability of the policy instrument 
comes into doubt.
 It is possible to narrate the early postwar macro-
economic history of Belgium and the Netherlands as a 
long attempt to get politicians to accept the principles 
of consociational democracy so that employers and 
trade unions–the social partners–could be coaxed into 
supporting a corporatist price incomes policy.  When 
politicians could agree to work toward consensus and 
they could succeed in bringing the social partners along, 
then the economy could flourish.  When politicians 
fought one-another or the social partners rebelled, that 
was not the end of the world.  But it did mean that the 
government lost an instrument for aggregate demand 
management–which also means it lost a lever for fos-
tering economic adjustment.
 The problem with this model is that not all firms pro-
duce traded goods and so not all firms face the same 
incentives or constraints.  For example, non-traded 
goods or service sector producers can have an inde-
pendent domestic price (Ps).  The investment formula 
for these firms remains much the same (see equation 
[3]). 
Π / P = (MPK * [Ps / P] - [W / P]) - (Pk / P) * (i - [ΔPk / Pk] + δ)  [3]
Nevertheless, the interpretation differs.  The reason 
for the difference is that the general price level (P) is a 
composite of traded (Pm) and non-traded prices (Ps):
P = α Pm + (1- α) Ps                                    [4]
So long as traded goods prices are set abroad, any 
increase in non-traded or service sector goods prices 
will have a less than proportional effect on the general 
price level.  As a result, the incentives for firms are no 
longer ambiguous.  Higher non-traded goods prices 
increase revenues and any resulting increase in the 
general price level lowers costs–at least to the extent 
that it reduces real wages (W / P) and relative capital 
goods prices (Pk / P).  Even worse, these non-traded 
or service sector providers may be willing to pay higher 
wages so long as they know they can increase the price 
of their outputs in domestic markets by enough to make 
it pay.  In turn this incentive among certain employers 
strengthens the hands of trade union wage negotiators 
who are eager to secure nominal wage increases and 
wary that firm pricing behavior will push real wages the 
opposite way.
 The narrative of Belgian and Dutch postwar eco-
nomic history shows these adverse incentives at work. 
While politicians sought to cooperate with one-another 
in order to gain control over prices and wages, some 
employers and some labor organizations sought to 
escape from the constraints of government nurtured 
price-wage control.  Predictably the strongest defectors 
came from the non-traded sectors.  Their impact on 
prices not only aggravated domestic inflation, but also 
undermined confidence in the price-incomes policies 
as a whole.
 As consociational democracy began to break down, 
things got immeasurably worse.  Politicians stopped 
working together and their ability to foster effective 
price wage bargaining vanished as a result.  This was 
the experience of the 1970s.  During the course of that 
decade, wages and prices increased while investment 
declined.  Meanwhile both unemployment and govern-
ment deficits began to mount.
 The problem for both the Belgians and the Dutch 
was two-fold.  First, they could not go back and recon-
sider their initial preferences for open markets or fixed 
exchange rates.  The reason has to do with European 
integration.  Over time, the Belgians and the Dutch 
promoted the idea of European integration–at least in 
part–as a way to spread their policy preferences to other 
countries.  They were early and staunch advocates for 
the customs union and the common market; and they 
were equally enthusiastic about monetary integration 
and the European monetary system (EMS).
 The second problem was that efforts to get control 
over fiscal policy only exacerbated tensions among 
political elites and complicated negotiations between 
the social partners. Yet, as both countries learned by 
experience, losing control over fiscal policy is even 
worse.  The crisis of the early 1980s was a fiscal crisis 
as much as anything else.  Indeed real wages had al-
ready started to move in the right direction by the time 
the governments of either country had managed to 
reassert control.  Even so the success of Wilfried Mar-
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tens in Belgium and Ruud Lubbers in the Netherlands 
at reasserting effective price-wage policy is striking.  It 
was not easy in either country, but the crisis was averted 
in both.
 The interesting point about the early 1980s is that 
the adjustments made did not come about through con-
sensus in any traditional sense of the word.  They did 
not derive from some sort of consociational resurgence 
either.  Instead the governments of Belgium and the 
Netherlands used old political institutions and relation-
ships to intervene–or, in the Dutch case, to threaten 
to intervene–directly in wage bargaining, promoting 
competitiveness, investment, and, ultimately, economic 
growth.  The macroeconomic results were impressive 
even if they took a long time in coming.  The political 
results were not.  Although Martens and Lubbers man-
aged to avert the crisis, they left behind a legacy of 
bitterness among the mainstream political parties and 
between voters and elites.
 This is a strong accusation and it may be only 
partly deserved.  The fact of the matter is that politics 
was changing in Belgium and the Netherlands over the 
whole of the postwar period.  Consociational democracy 
lasted much longer as a heuristic model than as a po-
litical formula and it was less a continuous experience 
than a set of stochastic moments.  By the early 1990s, 
the era of consociational democracy was over and 
the old bonds between political elites, social partners, 
and the general electoral were gone along with it.  The 
implications were felt first by the Christian Democrats, 
who lost power in both countries for the first time in 
decades.  Later, these effects became more general 
as each of the traditional parties experienced its own 
personal rout.
 Government control over wage bargaining has suf-
fered as a result.  Now, the Belgians depend on a law 
on competitiveness to try to keep relative wage growth 
in check.  The Dutch rely on the lack of alternatives and 
the general fear of unemployment.  Both formulas are 
good for maintaining the status quo.  Neither is useful 
to foster adjustment.
 Nobody seems to care much.  If you look at politi-
cal debates in Belgium and the Netherlands, concerted 
wage bargaining is not high on anyone’s priority list. 
Instead they are focused on domestic political differ-
ences–between immigrant and national, urban and 
rural, old and young, or just about any one group and 
another.  Even consensus itself has become an object of 
political debate.  Of course there were always concerns 
that consensus building took too long, that decisions 
were only partial, and that the policy process was con-
gested.  Now, however, the fear is that consensus is 
elitist, unrepresentative, undemocratic, and illegitimate. 
Contestation is heralded as a virtue and external vul-
nerability is an excuse for further conflict rather than 
common concern.
 Of course it is easy to paint a dark picture of coun-
tries that most people know little about.  If you were to 
go to Belgium and the Netherlands, they would be likely 
to paint an even darker picture of themselves.  Things 
really are not all that bad in either place.  They are not 
all that exceptional either.  And that is precisely the 
point.  With the political transformation of the postwar 
era, Belgium and the Netherlands have grown up to 
face their own diversity.  Meanwhile, the influence of 
world market forces have made matters worse.  The 
division between traded and non-traded sectors is only 
one example.  The role of immigration is another.  Then 
too there is the selective interdependence between dif-
ferent parts of Belgian and Dutch society and specific 
buyers, suppliers, investors, or commodities that are 
located in particular parts of the outside world.
 In a sense, interaction with the world has made 
Belgium and the Netherlands bigger.  World markets are 
not the only source of change.  Political transformation 
has purely domestic origins as well.  Yet whatever the 
cause, consensus no longer comes so easily despite 
the fact that vulnerability to world market forces has 
increased. You can see this most easily in the immigra-
tion debate.  But as writers like Cas Mudde (1999) have 
argued, immigration is often used as a metaphor for the 
multiple insecurities and divisions that have emerged 
in our post-industrial, globalized world.  By engaging 
so enthusiastically in the world economy, Belgium and 
the Netherlands show the symptoms of this new–or 
newly rediscovered–diversity. For example, trade and 
investment lie at the heart of the division between 
Flanders and Wallonia just as the decline of traditional 
manufacturing and the rise of part-time service sector 
work is a defining feature of the Dutch model. Such 
influences are not malignant in their own right, but they 
do complicate consensus-building no matter what the 
degree of external vulnerability.  Belgium and the Neth-
erlands are no longer exceptional cases among small 
countries.  Instead, they are more like the normal case 
among big countries.  Government influence over the 
process of economic adjustment in Belgium and the 
Netherlands–and, arguably, across much of Western 
Europe–has diminished as a result.
Erik Jones is Professor of European Studies, SAIS 
Bologna Center, The Johns Hopkins University
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Notes
1.  This essays summarizes the argument made in Erik Jones, Eco-
nomic Adjustment and Political Transformation in Small States, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.  Ian Bruff, Aart Geens, 
Bryan Hoytt, and Zeynep Soyluoglu, provided useful comments 
on this paper in draft.  The usual disclaimer applies.
Willem Maas. Creating European Citizens. Lanham, 
Boulder, New York, Toronto, Plymouth UK: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2007.  
the author of this book suggests that most explanations 
of European integration are about how it meets the 
economic interests of member states, while he aims to 
show that developments in Europe also reflect a post-
war drive to create a community of people as well as 
a common market.  This is demonstrated, he argues, 
through an examination of the rise of European citizen-
ship.  Thus, the book is an account of the germination 
and development of European citizenship, showing 
that its origins long pre-date its formal inauguration in 
the Maastricht Treaty.  The book demonstrates that the 
ambition for a community of people, explicitly incorpo-
rating the word ‘citizenship’, was already present in the 
1940s and 1950s.  The embryonic idea of European 
citizenship was central to one of the two strands of 
opinion on the meaning of the free movement of workers 
(the other being that labour was but another factor of 
production in a common market).  The book accounts 
for how freedom of movement of labour graduated into 
freedom of movement for all persons and how this - to-
gether with attendant developments in social security, 
social policy and education policy -  was promoted by 
most, but not all, national political leaders, supported 
by supranational political actors.  Such developments 
were seen as being in their interests and in the interests 
of European integration.  While acknowledging that it is 
generally difficult to take away rights and that the story 
of European citizenship is not yet finished, the author 
concludes that the continuation of common European 
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citizenship may be at risk because, although it is said 
to be complementary with national citizenship, there 
are incompatibilities between it and national citizenship. 
Not least among these are the varieties of practices of 
national citizenship within the original member states 
and even more so among the new members.  
 In some ways the book’s focus on citizenship is not 
especially original as others have also traced this history 
or these histories.  But it has many strengths that mean 
this does not matter.  For a start, it not only integrates 
free movement and citizenship, the book also links the 
story with the question whether 3rd country migrants with 
long-standing residence should have the same rights 
as community migrants – hence, tackling the issue of 
the relationship between citizenship rights and human 
rights.  Secondly, the book provides an interesting 
discussion of the impact on European citizenship of 
enlargement and the interaction between European 
citizenship and the nationality and citizenship policies 
of new members – a topic that did not exist when other 
accounts of European citizenship were being written. 
And thirdly, the book provides convincing explanations 
of why there is also opposition among some political 
leaders, and their peoples, to European citizenship. 
Finally, the organization of the book is masterly.  All 
these issues are woven together in a mere 120 pages 
of text in such a way that none of their complexity is lost 
while, at the same time, the book could easily be read 
by an interested member of the public as well as the 
student or scholar.  The book ends with the intriguing 
question of why other cases of transnational integra-
tion and cooperation have not led to an interest in a 
socio-political dimension to such projects, as well as 
the economic one – in particular citizenship.  The au-
thor begins to provide an answer, leaving the reader in 
the hope that another little book like this will be written 
that deals more extensively with the question and its 
answer.
Elizabeth Meehan
Queen’s University Belfast
Dario Castiglione and Chris Longman (eds.)
The Language Question in Europe and Diverses Soci-
eties: Political, Legal and Social Perspectives. Oxford 
and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2007.
a new context of globalisation and the spread of multi-
culturalism has given renewed emphasis to the ques-
tion of social communication and language politics in 
Europe and its diverse societies. Presenting the latest 
developments of this research area, and under the 
editorship of D. Castiglione and C. Longman, this vol-
ume contains a selection of research papers presented 
during the workshop series on The Public Discourse of 
Law and Politics in Multilingual Societies organised in 
Oñati (Gipuzkoa, Spain) and sponsored by the Oñati 
International Institute for the Sociology of Law. 
 As underlined by all the authors, although the Euro-
pean Union (EU) is not the most linguistically diverse of 
continents, it is the first region where language played 
a crucial role in nation state building. Moreover, ever 
since European societies initiated a process of political 
and economic integration, the historical use of language 
as an instrument of communication and as a vector of 
cultural values has been complexified.
 Indeed, the EUs institutions seem condemned to 
a adopt a schizophrenic attitude. On the one hand, 
the EU sets out to respect equality between European 
languages by officially promoting “linguistic diversity” 
as one of its founding principles. On the other hand, 
the needs of European administration and the attrac-
tion exerted by the global market on consumers tend 
to favour the adoption of monolingualism through the 
diffusion of English – “or global English” – as a lingua 
franca. 
 This situation is the result of the historical (no-)deci-
sion in 1958of the first six member states to maintain 
four official languages as working languages. The 
inheritance of this statist vision of linguistic issues ren-
ders illusionary the current official recognition of twenty 
official languages (and maybe more with the possible 
integration of Turkey) in terms of translation services 
and transaction costs. Confronted with this linguistic 
opportunity structure, the authors emphasise the de-
bate on the EU linguistic regime is intimately related to 
the problem of the nature of the EU as a unitary state, 
a union of states or as a system of overlapping sub-
cultural areas which allows for a limited recognition of 
different languages in some spheres of governance, 
but only under the leadership of English.
 As a result, this approach to linguistics tends to 
favour the official languages of the Union (ie. state lan-
guages) and more particularly English. Today, such lan-
guages are considered to be the working languages of 
the European institutions and possess great resources 
in order to spread themselves across the continent. As 
the most spoken languages within the EU, they also 
easily attract professionals and students. Obviously, 
such a linguistic regime partially acts to the detriment 
of co-official and un-recognised languages such as 
regional languages or those of immigrants. 
 The present volume provides ample food for 
thought. First, it sets out a knowledgeable and com-
prehensive survey of existing literature on language 
politics. Second, the contributions to The Language 
Question encompass a large range of intellectual ap-
proaches such as theories of justice and fairness, com-
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municative spaces or new institutionalism in different 
research disciplines (anthropology, law, linguistic stud-
ies, politics, etc.). Third, clarity of analysis reflects the 
long pre-editing and re-writing preparatory work on the 
various contributions, all of which gives homogeneity 
to the volume.
 In summary, The Language Question is a very 
useful textbook for students, researchers and citizens 
who want to learn more about this original feature of 
European integration. I therefore warmly recommend 
this book and hope it will contribute to the development 
of language politics’ studies.
Jean-Baptiste Harguindégey
SPIRIT, Sciences Po Bordeaux
John McCormick.  The European Superpower. Hamp-
shire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2006.
Fraser Cameron.  An Introduction to European For-
eign Policy. New York: Routledge, 2007.
Jolyon Howorth. Security and Defense Policy in the 
European Union. Hampshire and New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007.
The Rising (super)Power
Scrap the ubiquitous description of the EU as “An eco-
nomic giant but political pygmy”; it is a superpower in 
making. That common message emanates from three 
empirically rich, skillfully researched, and frequently 
provocative books which present the EU as a global 
power in ways heretofore lacking in the burgeoning 
literature on EU’s international influence.  Between 
Cameron’s survey of institutions, actors, policies, and 
events, to McCormick’s focus on the union’s global 
economic influence, and rising ideational, moral and 
political leadership, and Howorth’s demystification of 
the union’s rapidly developing security and defense 
dimension, the reader is provided a comprehensive 
introduction to the often absurd complexity that char-
acterizes the EU’s external relations. 
 Though recognizing America’s impressive economic 
and military powers, McCormick’s largely comparative 
study presents a changing international system where 
Europe’s success in coupling social responsibility with 
economic prosperity is enhancing its international influ-
ence. His argument of a European superpower rests on 
three pillars. First, the EU’s enormous and growing eco-
nomic influence is far greater than most (practitioners 
and citizens) recognize and appreciate. Second, EU 
integration, common European interests, and its institu-
tions are mutually and perpetually reinforcing, resulting 
in common external interests and increased assertive-
ness. Rising global expectations of EU engagements in 
turn feed into to EU institutions and citizens, furthering 
a common understanding of Europe, European identity, 
and interests. 
 Yet the novelty of McCormick’s intriguing and pro-
vocative study is how these developments both under-
pin and complement the union’s growing ideational and 
moral leadership in areas ranging from trade to conflict 
prevention and resolution, to environmental policy, 
to migration. In our post-modern world of increasing 
interdependence, soft power assets are key (p.5-7), 
while military power has lost much credibility and influ-
ence. While “The United States has lost its position as 
a leader and an initiator“ (p.159), states and regions 
around the world are increasingly following the EU’s 
lead and emulating EU practices (16, 135 ff). 
 McCormick’s book reads like a well articulated des-
perate cry for recognition of the EU’s global economic, 
moral and political influence in a world where power 
is more than big bombs and tanks, and influence is 
wielded in multiple ways. The international system is not 
only more suited to this new type of multi-dimensional 
superpower, whose visible strengths are complemented 
by latent or indirect power (e.g. dominant ideas and 
values), but the EU is in fact shaping the international 
system through its actions and leadership. His over-
whelmingly positive and thought-provoking assess-
ment of the EU’s international influence is tapered only 
occasionally by a sober realization of the EU’s many 
remaining problems, including most of those identified 
by Cameron. 
 Premised on a broad definition of foreign policy, “all 
external actions taken by the actor” (p.xiv), Cameron 
presents an excellent survey of the EU’s institutions, 
policies, and its geographical areas of interest. He is 
more critical of the efficiency of EU foreign policy than 
McCormick. While agreeing that integration strengthens 
the union’s international influence by drawing on pooled 
or common resources and interests, its foreign policies 
are frequently confusing, and lacking in coherence 
and uniformity, and riddled with overlapping authori-
ties stemming from inter-institutional jurisdictional and 
territorial squabbles. Speaking at times with one voice 
(trade and aid), at other times through coordination (e.g. 
UN, IMF), or structured cooperation (CFSP/ESDP), it 
leaves the EU lacking the effectiveness achievable 
through a unified, state-like, structure. He brings atten-
tion to lack of political will to cede more authority to truly 
common institutions (rather than cooperative ones), 
and the schisms created by member states’ divergent 
national interests. Brief reflective case studies (e.g. on 
the Kosovo conflict, WTO disputes, the Iraq invasion, 
or Iran’s nuclear program) provide valuable insight on 
how the EU is coping with growing expectations, while 
also showing how state interests and reversions to na-
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tional solutions often prevent a unified European voice. 
Cameron also discusses the many successful aspects 
of EU policy, overall grading the EU as a “qualified 
super power”, but one which still – lamentably – lacks 
America’s military power projection capabilities.
 In the burgeoning literature on the EU’s CFSP 
and ESDP Howorth’s is one the most illuminating and 
rewarding to date. He manages to explain, especially 
in chapters three and four, the inner workings of the 
numerous institutions and committees that make up the 
ESDP and clarifies how they work together in practice 
– showing where the real problems in daily planning 
and decision making lie. He tackles the many distor-
tions, misinformation, and myths of the surrounding 
ESDP, effectively dismissing fears of an EU military 
overriding state sovereignty. Howorth explains how 
civilian crisis management is critically important (p.93), 
but that civil-military coordination, presumably EU’s 
advantage vis-à-vis the US, still needs improvements. A 
lack of political will and capabilities mean that although 
heretofore completed ESDP operations represent sig-
nificant progress, the EU is not yet a major international 
strategic actor (p.113), even if the emerging European 
strategic culture (ch.7) shows it is maturing.
 All authors should be commended – Howorth in 
particular – for accessible writing on complex issues. 
These writers exemplify how one can simplify without 
losing substance. Each book also contains useful 
comparisons to US policies and leadership, and they 
all enlighten the reader on how, where, and why the 
EU’s global influence has reached new heights without 
delving into minute details of bureaucratic intricacies 
or legal word wrangling. One criticism relates to the 
use of theory. Cameron briefly presents the dominant 
theories of international relations (pp.19-21), but then, 
contrary to his stated intentions, makes to effort to tie 
practice to theory, leaving that task solely to the reader. 
McCormick’s contribution lies in his discussions of con-
cepts such as power (ch. 1), influence, and ideas (ch.5), 
but there is no attempt to place the larger argument in 
any theoretical framework.
 While those seeking theoretical explanations of the 
CFP and ESDP should look elsewhere, these books 
are deserving of a wide audience, and should be the 
source of intense debate on the EU’s foreign policy 
and international influence.   All these books would be 
suitable for courses addressing the EU’s international 
influence, its foreign policy, or Transatlantic relations; 
the McCormick text also suits courses in international 
relations or globalization. 
Johan Eliasson
East Stroudsburg University, Pennsylvania
The 2007-2009 EUSA Executive Committee is pleased to 
announce the 2008 EUSA Haas Fund Fellowship Competi-
tion, an annual fellowship for graduate student EU-related 
dissertation research. Thanks entirely to contributions to 
our Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for EU Studies, launched 
in June 2003 to honor the memory of the late scholar Ernst 
B. Haas (1924-2003) we will offer at least one unrestricted 
fellowship of $2,000 to support the dissertation research of 
any graduate student pursuing an EU-related dissertation 
topic in the academic year 2008-09.
The selection committee consists of:
-  Liesbet Hooghe (EUSA chair, and University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill and Free University of Amster-
dam).
-  Mitchell Smith (University of Oklahoma)
-  Andrea Lenschow (University of Osnabrueck)
Please note the following stipulations for applicants, who 
must:
• be pursuing the doctoral degree (PhD) at an accredited 
institution in any country;
• be writing a dissertation in English;
• have an EU-related, doctoral dissertation topic ap-
proved by the professor who will supervise it; and,
• be able to demonstrate clearly the relevance to EU 
studies of the dissertation topic. 
Applicants for this Fellowship should submit:
(1)  A one-page letter of application that specifies how the 
fellowship would be used;
(2)  A CV;
(3)  A two-page (500 words) précis of the dissertation re-
search project that also explains its relevance to EU 
studies; and,
(4)  Ask for two letters of support to be sent directly to 
EUSA. These letters should be from professors serv-
ing on the student’s dissertation committee, and one 
should be the chair.
Please send applications to eusa@pitt.edu and use the 
heading “2008 E.B. Haas Fund Fellowship competition.” 
The firm deadline for applications to be received in the 
EUSA office is January 18, 2008. The successful applicant 
will be notified by April 1, 2008, at the latest, and will re-
ceive the grant as soon as the fellowship award letter has 
been signed and returned to EUSA. The fellowship will be 
paid in one lump sum by check only and in US$ only.
Ernst B. Haas Fund
Fellowship
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EUSA  
Lifetime 
Membership
What is it?
Simply put, it is a one-time dues pay-
ment to EUSA of US$ 1500.
What does it include?
The Lifetime Membership includes 
all regular membership benefits for 
life. Among those benefits currently 
are subscription to the quarterly EUSA 
Review, receipt of occasional EUSA 
monographs, discounted registration 
rates at the EUSA International Con-
ference, subscription to our e-mail List 
Serve, and the opportunity to join EUSA 
interest sections. 
Are there any other benefits?
By making a one-time membership 
payment, you not only avoid the task 
of renewing each year, but gain the 
twin advantages of securing lifetime 
membership at today’s dollar values 
and avoiding future dues increases.
Who should do this?
Any person wishing to support the en-
deavors of the European Union Studies 
Association—the fostering of schol-
arship and inquiry on the European 
integration project. For U.S. taxpayers, 
an additional benefit is a receipt for a 
one-time $500 charitable contribution 
to EUSA, tax-deductible to the extent 
allowed by law (reducing your tax li-
ability for the year in which you become 
a Lifetime Member).
How do I become a Lifetime Member?
Simply mail your check, in US$ and 
made payable to “EUSA,” to the Euro-
pean Union Studies Association, ad-
dress given at right. (We can not accept 
lifetime membership payments by credit 
card.) We will send you a receipt and 
letter of acknowledgment.
EuropEan union StudiES aSSociation
New Individual Membership Form Only (Please type or print)
Name ________________________________________________
Address ______________________________________________
_____________________________________________________
City _________________________________________________
State/Province________________  Postal Code_______________
Country ______________________________________________
Work Telephone _______________________________________
Work Facsimile ________________________________________
E-mail _______________________________________________
Your Professional Affiliation ______________________________
_____________________________________________________
Do you wish to be subscribed to
EUSA’s e-mail List Serve?  _____ yes          _____ no
Membership dues (please check as appropriate):
Individual _____ $90 two-year membership
Student* _____ $55 two-year membership
Lifetime Membership _____ $1500 (+ credit for $500 tax deduction)
* Students must provide copy of current semester’s registration form.
EU Law Interest Section   _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
EU Political Economy Interest Section     _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
Teaching the EU Interest Section  _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
EU Latin America Caribbean Interest Section   _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
EU Economics Interest Section  _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
EU Public Opinion and Participation Section    _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
EU as Global Actor Section   _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
EUSA Public Policy Interest Section  _____ $10 )2 yrs.)
EUSA members may wish to make a contribution to support the work 
of EUSA in any amount over membership dues:
 EUSA Grants and Scholarships Fund $ _____
 Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for EU Studies $ _____
Total amount of dues and gifts enclosed       $ ________
We prefer payment by check (payable to “EUSA”) when possible. 
Checks must be in US$ and drawn on a USA bank. We also accept 
international money orders and MasterCard or Visa credit cards. Your 
cancelled check or credit card statement will be your receipt.
MasterCard  #  _________/__________/__________/_________
Visa  # _________/__________/__________/_________
Expiry ___/___  Last 3 digits from back side of card ___/___/___
Signature ____________________________________________
Mail or fax this form (please do not mail and fax this form) to:
    European Union Studies Association
    415 Bellefield Hall
    University of Pittsburgh
    Pittsburgh, PA 15260  USA
    Facsimile 412.648.1168 
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Lifetime Membership
$1500 for all our materials, for life, and credit for a one-time tax-deductible contribution of $500
EUSA Grants and Scholarships Fund
to support EU-related scholarship, the EUSA prizes, and travel to the biennial EUSA Conference
Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for EU Studies 
to honor the seminal work of Ernst B. Haas and support dissertation research in EU studies
Your gifts are tax-deductible to the extent allowable by U.S. tax law. Include a contribution with your membership 
renewal, or contact the EUSA Office to make a contribution. Call 412.648.7635 or e-mail eusa@pitt.edu.
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